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When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we 
agree that p when we each believe that p. But from a formal epistemological 
perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is 
unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of 
belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, 
even if it is true, it is too vague; for what it is to believe simpliciter ought to be 
explained in terms of degrees of belief. 
 
This paper presents several possible notions of agreement, and corresponding notions 
of disagreement. It indicates how the findings are fruitful for the epistemology of 
disagreement, with special reference to the notion of epistemic peerhood. 
 
1. Introduction – The Simple Account of Agreement 
 
When do we agree concerning some proposition, p? On the face of it, the answer is 
simple; we agree that p if and only if we each believe that p. This says nothing about 
the nature of belief, but this is a virtue. For example, those who take beliefs to be 
dispositions to act in particular ways, such as Price (1969), Marcus (1990) and 
Schwitzgebel (2002, 2010), may understand agreement as being more closely linked 
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to action than those who take beliefs to be mental representations, such as Fodor 
(1975) and Cummins (1996).1 
 
In contemporary formal epistemology, however, degree of belief replaces belief as the 
central notion. In philosophy of probability, the concept of a degree of belief is now 
relatively old; notably, it appears in the work of Keynes (1921), Ramsey (1926), and 
De Finetti (1937). However, using degrees of belief to tackle general epistemological 
questions is relatively new. The explanation is partly that probability, and the 
philosophy thereof, was once considered to be the domain of the philosopher of 
science. (And even within that domain, the importance of degrees of belief, as distinct 
from logical relations, was long disputed. Both Carnap and Popper, for example, 
defended logical views of probability.2) Hence, degrees of belief were typically 
employed only in models of scientific confirmation and reasoning (within philosophy, 
as opposed to the social sciences). 
 
The reticence to use degrees of belief in broader contexts may also be partly 
explained by the ongoing controversy surrounding their nature. That is to say, there is 
a ‘nature of degree of belief’ debate that parallels the ‘nature of belief’ debate 
mentioned above. Are degrees of belief to be understood as mental representations, as 
dispositions to bet in particular ways, or as something else altogether? The lack of 
                                                
1 Some views on the nature of beliefs nevertheless have interesting consequences for views on 
agreement. For example, Schwitzgebel’s (2002, 2010) notion of ‘in-between believing’ suggests the 
possibility of ‘in-between agreement’. See footnote 9.  
2 Logical views can, but need not, involve degrees of belief. Fundamentally, they ground probabilities 
on logical relations between propositions. For more on this, see Rowbottom (2008) and Rowbottom 
(2015, pp. 24–26). 
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perceived progress in the debate is illustrated by the recent thesis of Eriksson and 
Hájek (2007), namely that ‘degrees of belief’ are basic and impervious to analysis. 
 
But let’s take it as uncontroversial that epistemology has something to learn from 
formal epistemology (without presuming anything so rash as that the latter has any 
form of priority over the former, or that the converse is not true). And let us start with 
a rough and ready notion of a ‘degree of belief’, as a degree of confidence. A simple 
example captures the essence of the idea. I am more confident that I am writing a 
paper on agreement than I am that it will be published in a leading journal of 
philosophy. But I nevertheless believe each proposition to be true. 
 
Using degrees of confidence is sufficient to provide a coarse-grained map of the 
terrain, and indicate that much of the land is fertile. If this makes you feel uneasy, 
consider that informal epistemology normally proceeds without presuming an answer 
to, or even considering, ‘What is belief?’ This question is understood to fall within the 
philosophy of mind. Hence, it would be unwise to demand that the formal 
epistemologist to begin with a complete answer to ‘What is degree of belief?’ 
 
So we have a plan. We will examine how we may construe agreement in terms of 
degrees of confidence.3 But what is the point of the exercise? Intrinsic interest aside, 
understanding agreement is key to understanding disagreement. (Although, as we will 
                                                
3 Only agreement and disagreement between individuals will be discussed in this paper. However, 
several of the results plausibly hold for group level agreement and disagreement. For instance, the D-
functions discussed might be construed to reflect group degrees of belief. On group degrees of belief 
and probabilities, see Gillies (1991), Gillies (2000, ch. 8), Rowbottom (2013) and Rowbottom (2015, 
ch. 6). 
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see, disagreement should not be equated merely with the absence of agreement.) And 
the epistemology of disagreement is an area of burgeoning interest, as evidenced by a 
number of recent edited works, e.g. Christensen (2009), Feldman and Warfield 
(2010), and Christensen and Lackey (2013). Participants in this debate typically 
operate with an intuitive understanding of disagreement. As we will see, however, 
analyzing disagreement proves productive. 
 
Only a brief warning remains, before we begin. We will not work with the idea that 
there is a single correct account of agreement; and we will assume neither that the 
folk notion of agreement, nor that our intuitions about agreement, are of special 
significance. Rather, we will be exploring, and refining, several alternative 
understandings of agreement. 
 
2. Perfect Agreement and Close Agreement 
 
Imagine two people, A and B, have the same evidence, e, concerning whether a 
hypothesis, h, is true. (We will take evidence to be propositional in character, for the 
time being, although this is an issue that we will return to in the final section.) More 
precisely, imagine that each has an active degree of confidence involving these 
propositions, DA(h⎪e) and DB(h⎪e). Think of DS(h⎪e) by analogy with PS(h⎪e) on a 
subjective theory of probability; it represents how confident a subject S is about h, 
assuming e is true. DS(h⎪e) is active for S when e represents S’s current evidence (or 
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background assumptions).4 S will also have inactive conditional degrees of 
confidence concerning h, such as DS(h⎪e*), where e* is different from e. DS(h⎪e*) 
reflects S’s degree of confidence in h conditional on S’s evidence being e*.  
 
The motivation for using D-functions, rather than P-functions, is that we can discuss 
degrees of confidence without presuming that they satisfy the axioms of probability. 
And it appears they don’t, even if they should, because some people do allow 
themselves to be Dutch Booked.5 But irrationality does not prevent agreement; two 
irrational individuals may agree on h, just as an irrational individual may agree with a 
rational individual on h. 
 
The ground is prepared. We may begin by considering a case where agreement is 
clear cut. Let’s call this perfect agreement: 
 
                                                
4 The concept of evidence in operation is subjective, rather than objective; so keep ‘background 
information’ in mind. For more on the different notions, see Achinstein (2001), Rowbottom (2014), 
and Williamson (2015). 
5 This matter isn’t as simple as it may first appear. More accurately, we should say that people 
sometimes select betting quotients that are not coherent (or make bets such that they lose money 
whatever happens). In this event, their betting quotients violate the axioms of probability. But only on 
the assumption that the betting quotients have the same (or appropriately similar) values as degrees of 
confidence may we conclude that the latter do not satisfy the axioms of probability. See Gillies (2000, 
pp. 55–58) and Rowbottom (2015, pp. 38–52). 
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Perfect Agreement on h at Time t: DA(h⎪e)=DB(h⎪e), where e is A’s evidence 
concerning h at t and e is B’s evidence concerning h at t.6 
 
It is unnecessary, however, to insist that agreement (between A and B on h) is only 
present, at any time t, under such circumstances. Rather, it appears that phenomena 
worthy of the name ‘agreement’ can persist even in the absence of such perfect 
agreement. 
 
First, let’s allow the degrees of confidence of A and B to vary, in a hypothetical class 
of scenarios, while keeping everything else fixed. We might initially consider the 
following: 
 
Close Agreement on h at Time t: DA(h⎪e)≈DB(h⎪e), where e is A’s evidence 
concerning h at t and e is B’s evidence concerning h at t. 
 
In a broad range of situations, close agreement on h is indistinguishable from perfect 
agreement on h. Provided neither cites anything other than their evidence concerning 
h, an earnest discussion between A and B on the topic of h is unlikely to result in any 
changes to A’s and B’s active degrees of conviction about h. (That is, assuming A 
does not treat evidence that B agrees on h as evidence that h, as he might do if she 
                                                
6 Some minor refinements might be advisable; for example, one might specify that agreement does not 
obtain, when evidence is shared, in the event that said evidence is internally inconsistent. For present 
purposes, let’s handle this by stipulating that evidence may not have this feature. Other similar minor 
adjustments are highly unlikely to bear on what follows. 
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thinks B is an epistemic peer, and vice versa.7) Such a discussion would likely result 
in each party thinking that the other had reasonable, indeed correct, views about h. 
 
Nonetheless, there are situations where the presence of only close agreement, rather 
than perfect agreement, is noticeable; if A and B seek to agree on a fair betting 
quotient on h in a high-stakes situation (for both of them), then a minor dispute 
between them might ensue. 
 
3. Context and Agreement as a Threshold Difference 
 
It is now natural to wonder how much difference there must be between DA(h⎪e) and 
DB(h⎪e) in order for A and B to disagree on h. Consider the magnitude DA(h⎪e) – 
DB(h⎪e), i.e. ⎮DA(h⎪e) – DB(h⎪e)⎮. Call this DA-B(h⎪e). What range of values may 
this function take when A agrees with B about h?  
 
To ask this question without qualification is make two questionable assumptions, 
namely that disagreement is: (a) all-or-nothing, and (b) contextually invariant. Let’s 
consider these in turn. 
 
Keep considering a hypothetical situation where close agreement holds, but where A 
and B are in dispute about how to bet on h because the stakes are high. On the one 
hand, we might say that A and B agree on h but disagree about how to bet on h. On 
the other hand, we might say that A and B disagree about how to bet on h because 
                                                
7 See Kelly (2005) and Elga (2007) on the wisdom of conciliation in such circumstances. For present 
purposes, note merely that A might treat B’s agreement that h as evidence that h even if she should not. 
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they disagree about h. And it is far from obvious which path is preferable, let alone 
whether there is a fact of the matter about which is correct. It may therefore be better 
to operate directly with the notion of difference in confidence (which one could refer 
to as ‘degree of disagreement’), i.e. DA-B(h⎪e), in cases where background evidence is 
shared. 
 
One might couple this with thinking that agreement is (typically) context relative, or 
at least that agreement ascriptions are (typically) context relative. In other words, the 
difference in confidence required for (attributing) agreement may vary according to 
the situation in which the actors find themselves. For example, if DA-B(h⎪e)≈0, i.e. if 
so-called ‘close agreement’ holds, then A and B might be said to agree unless they 
find themselves in an exceptional situation, where being right about h is of extreme 
importance. 
 
Remain unconvinced? The alternative is that there is some threshold value, r, such 
that A and B agree on h when DA-B(h⎪e)<r. However, the implausibility of this can be 
illustrated by a consideration of limit cases. First, imagine that A is neutral about 
whether h or not-h, whereas B is slightly more confident that h than not-h; DA-
B(h⎪e)<r, DA(h⎪e)=DA(~h⎪e)=0.5, and DB(h⎪e)>DB(~h⎪e). If forced to bet for or 
against h, A might flip a fair coin to decide. In the same situation, however, B might 
resist flipping a fair coin. So if A and B were forced to bet jointly (with shared funds), 
we would expect them to be more likely to agree on betting for h than against h, 
ceteris paribus. 
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Second, consider a case where A is certain that h but B is only strongly convinced that 
h; DA-B(h⎪e)<r, DA(h⎪e)=1, and DB(h⎪e)<1. And imagine that being wrong about h 
would have dire consequences. Let’s say A and B are morally upright scientists, 
working together to prevent the extinction of the human race. They have identified 
two possible courses of action to deal with a virulent virus, which has infected all 
humans. They are certain that the first course of action will result either in all infected 
individuals being cured if h is true, or all infected individuals dying if h is false. They 
are also certain that the second course of action will result in between 70% to 90% of 
all infected individuals being cured (and the remainder dying). Will A and B advocate 
the same course of action, even assuming that they share the same values and 
desires?8 Not necessarily. A will recommend the first course of action. But B may 
prefer the second course of action, due purely to her sliver of doubt that h is wrong.9  
 
To resist the conclusion that agreement (or ascriptions thereof) should be understood 
as contextual, one might instead deny that ‘close agreement’ ever counts as genuine 
agreement (but accept that ‘perfect agreement’, for example, does). This does 
violence to the folk (or everyday) notion of agreement, however, since we normally 
                                                
8 This may be made more precise, if we think in terms of decision or game theory; we may say that the 
utilities for each option are the same for each scientist, but that the expected utilities for each diverge in 
virtue of their differing degrees of confidence. 
9 The prior examples also provide a basis for challenging the theory that agreeing that p is simply 
sharing the belief that p, on some accounts of the nature of belief. Consider the dispositionalism 
advocated by Schwitzgebel (2002: 253), according to which: ‘To believe that P … is nothing more than 
to match to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects the dispositional stereotype for believing 
that P.’ A and B may have near identical dispositional profiles, each matching the dispositional 
stereotype for believing h in appropriate respects. Yet it is not obvious that they agree on h. 
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ascribe agreement whenever ‘close agreement’ holds. And the folk notion is useful for 
predictive purposes, at the bare minimum, in everyday contexts. 
 
Hence, one might proceed with an explicitly contextual definition such as the 
following: 
 
Threshold Agreement on h at Time t: ⎮DA(h⎪e) – DB(h⎪e)⎮<r, where e is A’s 
evidence concerning h at t, e is B’s evidence concerning h at t, and the value 
of r is set by the context in which A and B are situated. 
 
As we will shortly see, such a definition is partial on some reasonable conceptions of 
agreement – and presents only a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for 
agreement – where agreement is possible even when parties (such as A and B) have 
different background information (‘evidence’). Beforehand, however, we should 
consider the possibility that agreement can be thought of in a diachronic sense. 
 
4. Diachronic Agreement 
 
The previous conceptions of agreement are all synchronic, although diachronic 
conceptions are also possible. For example, A and B might have identical conditional 
degrees of belief concerning h, such that they will be in perfect agreement on h 
whenever they share the same evidence. More precisely, we can state this condition as 
follows. 
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Shared Evidence Perfect Agreement on h: {DA(h⎪e1)=DB(h⎪e1), 
DA(h⎪e2)=DB(h⎪e2), … , DA(h⎪en-1)=DB(h⎪en-1), DA(h⎪en)=DB(h⎪en)}, where 
{e1, e2, …, en-1, en} is the set of all possible states of background information for 
A and B. 
 
It is easy to see how one might generate other similar conceptions. For example, a 
weaker version of the prior condition, where A and B will only be in close agreement 
whenever they share the same evidence, can be outlined as follows. 
 
Shared Evidence Close Agreement on h: {DA(h⎪e1)≈DB(h⎪e1), 
DA(h⎪e2)≈DB(h⎪e2), … , DA(h⎪en-1)≈DB(h⎪en-1), DA(h⎪en)≈DB(h⎪en)}, where 
{e1, e2, …, en-1, en} is the set of all possible states of background information for 
A and B. 
 
These may be conceptualized as situations where synchronic agreement has a high 
degree of stability (although higher degrees are possible, e.g. in the event that the 
parties’ degrees of confidence are insensitive to changes in evidence). However, there 
is often a sense in which ‘agreement’ on an issue implies more than synchronic 
perfect or close agreement, in so far as it implies that bringing the parties to disagree 
on that issue (synchronically) would not be an easy matter. Perhaps the difference 
between the locutions ‘agreement that’ and ‘agreement on’ is significant here. That is, 
in so far as what follows ‘agreement on’ need not be a specific proposition, but can 
instead be a label for a cluster of propositions with a vague boundary. ‘A and B agree 
on foreign policy’ and ‘A and B agree on political ideology’, for example, suggest 
that a considerable measure of stability in close agreement obtains. 
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More limited conceptions of diachronic agreement may be employed, to capture such 
cases; for example, it may be specified that only specific changes (or classes of 
change) in shared evidence would result in the lack of (perfect or close) agreement. 
And by comparing the changes, or classes of changes, rankings of stability may 
sometimes be possible. 
 
Diachronic extensions of many of the following synchronic conceptions are also 
possible. These will not be presented, for simplicity’s sake. 
 
5. Superficial Disagreement 
 
Consider now a specific kind of case where two people disagree on whether a 
hypothesis is true – in so far as one asserts that it’s true, whereas another asserts that 
it’s false – although their relevant conditional degrees of belief are identical or highly 
similar. More precisely, consider that the following two conditions may hold despite 
(unconditional) disagreement: 
 
Symmetrical Conditional Perfect Agreement on h at Time t: DA(h⎪e)=DB(h⎪e) 
and DA(h⎪e*)=DB(h⎪e*), where e is A’s evidence concerning h at t and e* is 
B’s evidence concerning h at t, and e is not identical to e*. 
 
Symmetrical Conditional Close Agreement on h at Time t: DA(h⎪e)≈DB(h⎪e) 
and DA(h⎪e*)≈DB(h⎪e*), where e is A’s evidence concerning h at t and e* is 
B’s evidence concerning h at t, and e is not identical to e*. 
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Here’s a concrete example. Imagine two scientists, Alex (A) and Belinda (B), are 
discussing whether the Higgs boson has been detected. The evidence of A, e, is 
contained within the evidence of B, e*. However, B has additional evidence of which 
A is unaware, from an experiment she has just taken part in; in summary, e is a proper 
subset of e*. Here’s a way their discussion might unfold. Belinda mentions the Higgs 
boson. Alex expresses the view that caution about its existence is still appropriate. In 
response, B expresses surprise. It emerges, in short order, that A has not ‘heard the 
news’. So B presents the results of her recent experiment to A. As a result, A concurs 
that the Higgs boson exists. B then says that A was right to doubt the existence of the 
Higgs boson, before hearing about the experiment in which she had taken part. 
 
In such situations, there is a strong sense in which disagreement about h is superficial; 
if A had B’s evidence, then A would agree with B about h, and vice versa. Indeed, 
one might say that the genuine (or deep) disagreement concerns only the evidence for 
or against h; for the resolution of that disagreement, in favor of either of the parties, 
results in their agreement on h. More precisely, the following condition obtains: 
 
Strong Superficial Disagreement on h at Time t: DA(h⎪e)≠DB(h⎪e*), but 
DA(h⎪e)=DB(h⎪e) and DA(h⎪e*)=DB(h⎪e*), where e is A’s evidence 
concerning h at t and e* is B’s evidence concerning h at t.10 
                                                
10 Many variants are possible, such as the following: 
 
Weak Superficial Disagreement on h at Time t: DA(h⎪e)≠DB(h⎪e*), but DA(h⎪e)≈DB(h⎪e) and 
DA(h⎪e*)≈DB(h⎪e*), when e is A’s evidence concerning h at t and e* is B’s evidence 
concerning h at t. 
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Prima facie, one might think that such a situation is better described as follows: A and 
B agree about the extent to which they would individually believe in h, provisional on 
having the other’s evidence, although they disagree on h and the evidence itself. This 
is incorrect, however, because it is possible for people to have false beliefs about their 
provisional degrees of belief, and even their active degrees of belief. Accept that there 
are some circumstances where degrees of belief are accurately measured, e.g. by 
gambling scenarios. How one finds oneself betting may deviate from how one 
anticipates betting, as Ramsey (1926) shows. In short, degrees of belief are not, in 
general, luminous. Conditional agreement, as defined, is therefore interestingly 
distinct from the accounts of agreement previously discussed. It need not be 
symmetrical, as it was in the example above. We can also recognize the existence of 
asymmetrical cases.11 
 
6. Superficial Agreement 
 
Agreement may also be superficial; for example, A and B may accept the same 
betting odds as fair for a given event, but for different reasons. Annabel (A) and 
Bruce (B) might be equally confident that a particular horse will win a race, although 
                                                
11 For instance, we could consider the following (along with an obvious alteration for close, rather than 
perfect, agreement): 
 
Asymmetrical Conditional Perfect Agreement on h at Time t: Either DA(h⎪e)=DB(h⎪e) & 
DA(h⎪e*)≠DB(h⎪e*) or DA(h⎪e*)=DB(h⎪e*) & DA(h⎪e)≠DB(h⎪e), where e is A’s evidence 
concerning h at t and e* is B’s evidence concerning h at t, and e is not identical to e*.  
[The ‘either… or’ formulation denotes an exclusive or.] 
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A’s confidence might stem from data about the horse’s form relative to the 
oppositions’, over recent races, whereas B’s confidence might stem from insider 
information that the race will be fixed. In such a scenario, we may say there is: 
  
Superficial Perfect Agreement on h at Time t: DA(h⎪e)=DB(h⎪e*), where e is 
A’s evidence concerning h at t and e* is B’s evidence concerning h at t, and e 
is not identical to e*. 
 
And similarly, provided the betting odds accepted as fair are highly similar, we may 
say that the following holds: 
 
Superficial Close Agreement on h at Time t: DA(h⎪e)≈DB(h⎪e*), where e is 
A’s evidence concerning h at t and e* is B’s evidence concerning h at t, and e 
is not identical to e*. 
 
It is also plausible that superficiality comes in degrees, and that by appropriately 
narrowing down the class of superficial agreements (either perfect or close), we may 
identify such degrees. Consider the following definition, which captures a proper 
subset of superficial perfect agreements, to see this:  
 
Independent Perfect Agreement on h at Time t: DA(h⎪e)=DB(h⎪e*), where e is 
A’s evidence concerning h at t and e* is B’s evidence concerning h at t, and e 
shares none of the content of e*. 
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(There is an equivalent proper subset of close agreements, where ‘=’ is replaced by 
‘≈’; for concision, however, we will not cover this equivalent, or similar equivalents, 
from this point onwards.) Now it seems that the superficiality of the agreement would 
be less, provided that some the content of e and e* were to overlap (and that e and e* 
were to remain consistent). Indeed, it seems reasonable to think that the superficiality 
of the agreement is a function of the similarity relation between e and e*. 
 
We will not go into the issue of how to measure similarity here. (It is a notorious 
problem, which plagued Popper’s account of verisimilitude. See Miller 1974 and 
Tichý 1974.) Suffice it to note that disagreement may be rational even when e and e* 
differ by one proposition; a single flip of a coin where it lands on its side, for 
example, is sufficient to illustrate that the probability of heads or tails, on said flip, 
cannot have been one. (That is, provided the probability in question is not taken to be 
the frequency of heads or tails in the limit of an infinite collective of flips.) 
 
7. The Results Applied: Epistemic Peerhood 
 
We have covered a number of ways in which to make the notions of agreement and 
disagreement more precise, and also considered several ways by which to construe the 
extent of agreement or disagreement. We’ll now use these results to illuminate a key 
concept in the epistemology of disagreement over the past decade. 
 
A central question in the literature on disagreement is ‘What should one do when one 
learns that one disagrees with an epistemic peer?’ And how this should be answered 
depends crucially on how ‘epistemic peer’ is understood, although, as we will see, 
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several authors construe it differently. Kelly (2005, p.167) reports taking the term 
‘epistemic peers’ from Gutting (1982, p. 83), who specifies only that this refers to 
individuals with equivalent ‘intelligence, perspicacity, honesty, thoroughness, and 
other relevant epistemic virtues’. For Kelly (2005, p. 167), however, ‘epistemic peers’ 
must also be ‘equals … with respect to their exposure to evidence and arguments 
which bear on the question at issue.’ More precisely, Kelly (2005, section 2.3) writes: 
 
[T]wo individuals are epistemic peers with respect to some question if and 
only if they satisfy the following two conditions: 
 
(i) they are equals with respect to their familiarity with the evidence and 
arguments which bear on that question, and 
 
(ii) they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues such as 
intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias. 
 
Let’s now consider these conditions in terms of the distinctions made in the previous 
sections. Let A (Alice) and B (Bob) be two peers in Kelly’s sense, and let the 
‘question’ they are concerned with be whether a specific hypothesis, h, is true. Let e 
represent Alice’s evidence, and e* represent Bob’s evidence. 
 
Now consider the component of condition (i) relating to evidence. (We will come to 
arguments shortly). First, note that it is undesirably vague, in so far as what 
‘familiarity with the evidence’ involves is unspecified. In fact, the problem is twofold: 
it’s unclear what counts as ‘evidence’, and it’s unclear, even if this is decided, what 
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‘familiarity’ (and hence equality in measures thereof) involves. So let’s explore some 
options. 
 
Let’s assume that Kelly intends ‘evidence’ to be propositional (or sentential) in 
character, in line with the previous treatment in this paper. (If evidence is construed in 
a broader sense – e.g., if it may include physical objects such as guns and DNA 
samples – then it’s easy to see how legitimate disagreements may arise. Observation 
is theory-laden, and so forth.) Even then, ‘familiarity’ with a given item of evidence 
(for or against a hypothesis h) does not entail taking it to be evidence, on an objective 
account of evidence. For example, Alice might be familiar with the fact that there is a 
dark band in between primary and secondary rainbows without realizing that this is 
evidence in favor of the geometrical optical theories employed by Descartes and 
Newton. And this does not depend on her being ignorant of said theories; on the 
contrary, she may have studied them at secondary school.  
 
Moreover, the use of the definite article in ‘the evidence’ seems at odds with the 
notion that evidence has a subjective element. And evidence may have such a 
character on several views, e.g. that S’s evidence is what S knows (Williamson 1997), 
and hence believes, a.k.a. E=K, or that S’s evidence is what S assumes to be true 
(Williamson 2015), a.k.a. E=A. Thus, Kelly presumably has in mind the idea that 
there is public evidence, or something similar but with somewhat more limited scope, 
in line with Williamson (1997, p.717): 
 
Science depends on public evidence, which is neither the union nor the 
intersection of the evidence of each scientist. “It is known in S” and “We 
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know” (which is not synonymous with “Some/many/most/all of us know”) 
express the corresponding kind of knowledge.12 
 
Thus, we may understand ‘equals with respect to their familiarity with the evidence’ 
as ‘equals with respect to their familiarity with the public evidence [or some 
surrogate]’. This resolves the prior concerns, if we accept that what counts as public 
evidence pertinent to h is clear to Alice and Bob, e.g. in virtue of the source(s). We 
are now left to wonder exactly how to cash out ‘equals with respect to… familiarity’. 
And this will prove to be a context dependent matter, for as Kelly (2005, section 2.3) 
notes: 
 
[I]nasmuch as classes of epistemic peers with respect to a given issue consist 
of individuals who are ‘epistemic equals’ with respect to that issue, whether 
two individuals count as epistemic peers will depend on how liberal the 
standards for epistemic peerhood are within a given context. That is, whether 
two individuals count as epistemic peers will depend on how much of a 
difference something must be in order to count as a genuine difference, 
according to the operative standards. 
 
So a highly demanding standard for peerhood will require that e is identical to e*, 
whereas less demanding standards will require lesser degrees of similarity between e 
and e*. This in interesting, in terms of the previous analysis, in so far as for any less 
demanding standard, disagreement may be (either weakly or strongly) superficial on 
                                                
12 Such ‘public evidence’ could consist merely of statements classified as true, rather than statements 
that are genuinely true, on views such as E=A. 
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Kelly’s account, as it stands. (And presumably the highly demanding standard will 
not be operating in most real cases in which one takes another to be an epistemic 
peer. For instance, I do not think that any other philosopher working on disagreement 
takes into account precisely the same evidence on the matter as I do.) Moreover, an 
individual (who knows that she is) disagreeing with an epistemic peer should take this 
fact into account. Small differences in evidence are enough to mask the presence of 
symmetrical conditional close (or even perfect) agreement. And the probability that 
such differences in evidence exist for any two peers (in a suitably liberal sense) is 
high. Thus it appears appropriate, at the bare minimum, to assign a non-zero 
probability to the fact that such conditional agreement is present. If the possibility is 
judged significant, indeed, then this provides reasonable grounds for failing to 
conciliate. A better way to proceed might be to try to tease out exactly how one’s 
evidence differs from that of one’s peer, although this will be an extremely difficult 
task in some cases. Think of this from Alice’s perspective. On learning that she 
disagrees with Bob on h, she might, in virtue of classifying him as an epistemic peer 
(in a somewhat liberal sense), fail to conciliate because she takes this to likely result 
from some significant difference in the evidence of each, e and e*, despite their 
shared access to the public evidence (or a proper subset thereof). 
 
This brings me to Kelly’s mention of ‘arguments’. Clearly, these are propositional (or 
sentential) in character; and hence, we can sink these into e and e*, from a formal 
perspective. However, familiarity with an argument does not entail accepting its 
conclusion. One might not accept any number of its premises. Or one might see it as a 
reductio. Or one might think that it is fallacious, or weak. And so forth. In effect, this 
means that Alice should bear in mind that her disagreement with Bob on h may be 
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superficial even if they are aware of precisely the same arguments said to bear on h, 
simply because they have different beliefs about those arguments.13 This reinforces 
the above finding about the wisdom of non-conciliation in some possible scenarios, 
when peerhood is understood in Kelly’s sense. (I will use ‘conciliate’ loosely, as 
follows. To conciliate, upon learning of disagreement concerning h, is to alter one’s 
(degrees of) belief as a result.) 
 
So far, we have discussed only Kelly’s first condition for epistemic peerhood. Let’s 
now move on to the second, according to which equality is necessary in ‘general 
epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias’ (Kelly, 
section 2.3). What effect should we expect such equality to have? To answer this, let’s 
assume that we’re comparing two individuals with access to identical evidence and 
arguments. Let’s take this condition to hold for Alice and Bob, and consider their 
degrees of belief concerning the members of a finite set of hypotheses, {h1, … hn}. 
Should we expect them to have close agreement or even threshold agreement on each 
item, or at least most or many items, in that set? No. Imagine that Alice and Bob are 
both severely lacking, to the same extent, in general epistemic virtues. They just don’t 
care, or think very hard, about the hypotheses in question. What’s more, they have 
biases that they indulge. Perhaps Alice is a democrat, and Bob is a republican, and 
each hypothesis in the group is supported by one political party and rejected by the 
other. Alice just goes with whatever the democrat line is, whereas Bob goes with 
                                                
13 What exactly it takes for an argument (to be thought) ‘to bear’ on a claim is also worthy of analysis. 
For present purposes, however, note simply that there are clear cases where two people may both think 
that an argument bears on h, but in a different way. For example, one may take it to confirm h, whereas 
another may take it to disconfirm h. 
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whatever the republican line is. They are equally lacking in ‘freedom from bias’, 
although their biases are different.  
 
But now imagine that Bob and Alice were instead ‘epistemic equals’ in so far as they 
were maximally intelligent and thoughtful, totally free from bias, and so forth. Then it 
would be more reasonable to expect them to have close agreement or threshold 
agreement on some hypotheses in the set. That is, even though no such close 
agreement or threshold agreement is entailed unless many more assumptions – 
concerning the truth of evidentialism, the scope for rational degrees of belief to differ 
in value when evidence is fixed, and so on – are made. (It is no accident that Kelly 
(2010) begins with three examples where both parties are highly epistemically 
virtuous, and very well-informed. These examples make disagreement seem 
somewhat puzzling. But peerhood, as he defines it, doesn’t make disagreement 
between epistemic peers puzzling in general. That is, as we’ve seen, even when the 
standards for peerhood are not ‘liberal’.) 
 
It should already be clear, from these examples, that it is extremely difficult to 
determine how to relate being ‘equals with respect to epistemic virtues’ to (probable) 
synchronic agreement state. And this is so even when shared evidence and arguments 
are assumed to be identical. The most respectable way to proceed would be to 
consider differences in just one virtue at a time, rather than ‘epistemic virtues’ as a 
bunch. But we cannot do that, of course, because Kelly is not specific about the list of 
relevant virtues. The possibility space under consideration is vast, and vaguely 
circumscribed. It would be imprudent to conclude that conciliation is in general a 
correct (or incorrect) strategy, on the basis of considering this space directly. It is 
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possible that conciliation is sometimes obligatory and sometimes impermissible; 
moreover, there may even be cases where it is permissible but not obligatory. 
 
Now consider, by way of comparison, the view of Elga (2006). He acknowledges the 
significance of the factors used by Kelly (2005) to characterize peerhood, in so far as 
he recognizes that one might consider another’s ‘judgment’ – ‘the manner in which 
she forms opinions on the basis of even her information’ (Elga 2006, section 2) – as 
well as her relative state of ‘information’. However, Elga’s (2006: section 10) 
definition of peerhood makes no mention of these factors whatsoever: 
 
My use of the term ‘epistemic peer’ is nonstandard. On my usage, you count 
your friend as an epistemic peer with respect to an about-to-be judged claim if 
and only if you think that, conditional [sic] the two of you disagreeing about 
the claim, the two of you are equally likely to be mistaken.14 
 
I take it to follow that A and B are epistemic peers, concerning some claim h, 
provided that A and B are equally likely to be mistaken about h if they disagree about 
h. 
 
As it stands, though, this definition is curious. For example, it entails that you and I 
are epistemic peers concerning some claim, on which we disagree, if we’re both sure 
                                                
14 Elga (2006) continues: ‘In defense of my use, suppose that you think that conditional on the two of 
you disagreeing about a claim, your friend is more likely than you to be mistaken. Then however 
intelligent, perspicacious, honest, thorough, well-informed, and unbiased you may think your friend is, 
it would seem odd to count her as an epistemic peer with respect to that claim, at least on that occasion. 
You think that on the supposition that there is disagreement she is more likely to get things wrong.’ 
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to be mistaken about it. And it’s highly plausible that we’re both sure (for all practical 
purposes) to be mistaken when it comes to having accurate degrees of belief 
concerning some propositions. That is, although it may nevertheless be true that one 
of us is liable to have a more appropriate degree of belief than the other.  
 
Imagine that we are each presented with the same scientific papers on global 
warming, and that neither of us has studied global warming seriously beforehand. 
However, you have studied physics extensively, and have a degree in the subject, 
whereas I failed science at school. We read the papers carefully. You emerge highly 
confident that global warming (due to human action) is a genuine phenomenon (h), 
whereas I emerge rather less confident. (So we are neither in perfect agreement nor in 
close agreement on h.) An ideal agent, however, would have a higher degree of belief 
than either of us on h, after having been exposed to the same papers; she would be 
extremely confident that h. Now add that both of us lacked (and will always lack) the 
capacity to be extremely confident that h, on the basis of reading those papers, due to 
our intellectual limitations. There is a significant sense in which we were equally as 
likely to be mistaken about h, under the circumstances, although it does not follow 
that we are, or were, epistemic peers. Your degree of belief may have been likely to 
be considerably closer to that of the (hypothetical) ideal agent than mine. And it 
would be wise for us to prefer your judgement on h, in such a situation, if we became 
aware of our respective backgrounds. 
 
There are also some interesting problems with the use of probability in Elga’s 
definition. Consider, for example, employment of a relative frequency view of 
probability (as is common in statistics). Then to speak of the probability of 
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disagreeing on a specific claim is elliptical, strictly speaking; there are probabilities 
only for events within collectives, rather than single events. (As von Mises (1928: 18) 
pithily put it: ‘FIRST THE COLLECTIVE – THEN THE PROBABILITY’.) And this 
raises the question of which collective Elga wishes us to consider. For example, you 
may have a higher probability than me of being mistaken about a particular claim, on 
which we will disagree, when we consider the relative frequency of your being 
mistaken over all the propositions on which we might (hypothetically) disagree. But if 
we consider just the cases in which we might (hypothetically) disagree about climate 
science – to extend the previous example – then you may have a much lower 
probability than me of being mistaken about the aforementioned claim. This 
‘reference class’ problem is non-trivial, for reasons explained by Gillies (2000, pp. 
119–125 & 182–183) and Rowbottom (2015, pp. 109–111). And if Hájek (2007) is 
correct, it cannot be avoided merely by rejecting the relative frequency interpretation 
of probability (which I used for illustrative purposes). 
 
A simple way to deal with both of the aforementioned issues is to consider the extent 
to which diachronic forms of agreement, such as shared evidence conditional 
agreement, obtain.15 Doing so has the twin virtues of making the reference class 
explicit (and thus contextualizing the talk of ‘epistemic peers’) and making it clear to 
what extent the hypothetical and actual degrees of belief of ‘peers’ may differ (and 
thus rendering the talk of ‘epistemic peers’ more precise). 
 
                                                
15 This is compatible with, but does not require, thinking in terms of belief-revision rules following 
Lam (2011). It also doesn’t require construing peerhood in terms of ‘reliability’, measured in either of 
the formal ways that Lam (2011) discusses. 




The first half of this paper covered a variety of ways by which to make the notions of 
agreement and disagreement more precise. The second half illustrated that this 
conceptual apparatus may be put to good use in the epistemology of disagreement, 
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